We are delighted to announce the 4th international Munich Lecture in Ethics, to be held from June 3–5, 2025 at LMU Munich’s Center for Ethics and Philosophy in Practice. Under the overall title “Autonomy, Consent, Liberalism,” David Enoch—Professor of the Philosophy of Law and Fellow of Balliol College at the University of Oxford, as well as Rodney Blackman Chair in the Philosophy of Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem—will present three lectures exploring the nature and value of autonomy, the complexities of consent, and a bold reimagining of liberalism. Following each lecture, a distinguished commentator will offer a response, with ample time for open discussion.

As in previous years, the Munich Lecture in Ethics will be published by Oxford University Press, co-edited by Laura Valentini and Marius Baumann and overseen by series editor Monika Betzler. Previous speakers in the series include Philip Kitcher (2019), Baroness Onora O’Neill (2021), and Susan Wolf (2023).

 

Autonomy, Consent, Liberalism

The value of autonomy – roughly, of leading one's life according to one's own commitment, guided by one's own choices – is central to both moral and political philosophy. These lectures are a (partial) study in the morality and politics of autonomy. They ask questions about the value of autonomy in general – how it is best understood, how it is best served; they ask questions about how offenses against the value of autonomy are to be conceptualized – for instance, in the context of less than fully autonomous consent, or what I call flawed consent. And they sketch a full, and fully liberal, political vision that does justice to the value of autonomy.

Why Isn't Epistemic Autonomy of Value?

With some practical decisions, it is important to make them oneself rather than outsource to others, even if others are somewhat more likely to make the decision that is better (including for oneself). When it comes to forming beliefs, though, this doesn't seem to be the case – it's never epistemically justified to insist on forming the belief using only one's own devices, while acknowledging that relying on another is much more likely to get one to the truth. What best explain this difference – arguably, when it comes to the value of autonomy – between the practical and the epistemic domain? Answering this question, it turns out, is not only of interest in itself. It also helps in teaching general lessons about autonomy.

A Unified Theory of Flawed Consent

There is no remotely plausible way of doing moral and political philosophy without attributing moral significance to consent. On the other hand, there are also many cases in which consent may be flawed (and sometimes also invalid): Consent under coercion, manipulation, exploitation, nudging, false consciousness, and perhaps more. This paper is an attempt to give a theoretical unified treatment of all cases of flawed consent – to show what they all have structurally in common, while allowing also for the many ways in which they differ.

Shameless Liberalism: A Vision

A liberal – Robert Frost is attributed with saying – is someone too broad-minded to defend his own side in an argument. Not a good liberal, it seems to me, at least not when the argument is about liberalism itself. But Frost was not entirely wrong, at least about many who think of themselves as liberals. This paper is a sketch of what a liberal view should be like – one that is morally and politically confident, that does not succumb to moral skepticism or relativism, that is an in-principle uncompromising champion of the value of autonomy, but that at the same time is politically pragmatist, engages in non-ideal theory, and is willing to form all sorts of alliances and compromise in the ways such alliances require.

 

Speakers & Commentators

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